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Recent Developments 
Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore: 
A Police Officer May Lose Immunity From Civil Liability Where a Special 
Relationship Exists 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that where 
a police officer's affirmative 
actions and specific promises of 
protection establish a special 
relationship, his immunity from 
civil liability might not survive. 
Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 
359 Md. 101, 753 A.2d 41 (2000). 
In so holding, the court limited a 
police officer's immunity from civil 
liability for negligent discretionary 
acts and provided a way for victims 
of police negligence to recover for 
their injuries. 
On June 19, 1995, Baltimore 
City Police Officer Edward Colbert 
("Colbert") responded to a 
domestic violence call from Mary 
Williams ("Williams"), who had 
arrived home to find that her 
daughter, Valerie Williams 
("Valerie"), had been beaten by her 
boyfriend, George Watkins 
("Watkins"). While Colbert was 
taking statements, Watkins called 
and threatened to return to the house. 
Colbert told Valerie he was going 
to his car to call for someone to bring 
a camera. 
Williams' and Colbert's stories 
differed from this point. Williams 
alleged that she went out to the car 
and Colbert instructed her to stay 
in the house while he waited for an 
officer to bring a camera to 
document her injuries. Colbert 
31.1 U. Bait L.F. 84 
By Nichole Galvin 
claimed that he recieved Williams' 
consent to leave to retrieve a camera 
to document her bruises. Williams 
alleged that she went inside the 
house and left the door unlocked 
because she believed Colbert was 
outside. Shortly thereafter, Williams 
was going to talk to Colbert, but 
upon reaching the front door, 
Colbert was not outside. Instead, 
she found Watkins rushing to the 
house, and before she could shut the 
door, Watkins forced himself 
inside. Upon entering, Watkins 
shot Williams in the head and leg, 
killed Valerie and then shot himself. 
Williams filed a complaint in 
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
against the State of Maryland, the 
Mayor and City Council of 
Baltimore City, and Colbert. The 
circuit court dismissed the claims 
against the city and state and granted 
Colbert's motion for summary 
judgment, which the court of special 
appeals affirmed. The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland granted 
certiorari to decide whether Colbert 
was divested of discretion and 
ordered to protect Valerie and 
Williams, whether Colbert was 
protected by statutory immunity or 
common law immunity, and whether 
Colberts actions established a 
special relationship. Williams, 359 
Md. at 108, 753 A.2d at 45. 
First, the court held that Article 
27, section 798 (B)(2) of the 
Maryland Code ("section 798") 
and Baltimore City Police 
Department General Order 10-93 
("BCPD 10-93 ") did not divest 
Colbert of discretion and mandated 
that he protect the Williamses 
because neither was applicable to 
the facts of the case. Id. at 129, 
753 A.2d at 56. The court 
determined that the legislative 
purpose of section 798 was to 
authorize the police under the 
umbrella of statutory immunity to 
protect domestic violence victims 
where the violence occurs in the 
officer's presence and where the 
officer escorts a victim, who has fled 
the family home, back to the home 
to recover personal items. /d. at 125, 
753 A.2d at 54. Neither 
circumstance existed in this case. /d. 
Moreover, the court held that BCPD 
1 0-93 creates a duty to protect 
domestic violence victims at the time 
the violence is occurring, and not for 
an indefinite period oftime. Id. at 
129,753 A.2d at 56. Accordingly, 
Colbert was not mandated by section 
798 or BCPD 10-93 to protect 
Valerie and Williams and was 
therefore not divested of discretion. 
!d. 
Second, the court held that 
Colbert was protected by statutory 
immunity generally and by common 
law immunity to the extent that his 
acts were discretionary. I d. at 131, 
753 A.2d at 57. Statutory immunity 
in the context of public official 
immunity is codified in sections 5-
511 (b )and 5-61 O(b) of the Courts 
and Judicial Proceedings Article of the 
Maryland Code. !d. (citing Md. Code 
Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 5-511(b), 
5-610 (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol.)). 
Section 5-511 (b) provides statutory 
immunity from civil liability for police 
officers acting within the scope of their 
employment in a discretionary manner 
without malice. I d. Section 5-61 O(b) 
provides immunity for a police officer 
who responds to requests for 
assistance under the authority of 
Article 27, section 798. !d. at 131, 
753 A.2d at 57. The court opined 
that although section 798 was 
inapplicable to the present case, it 
shed light on the legislative intent to 
ensure that officers were in no way 
"stripped of their accustomed 
immunity'' when acting within statutory 
authority. !d. at 134, 753 A.2d at 58. 
The legislature sought to alleviate 
the fear of police officers that if they 
found themselves acting beyond the 
scope of normal police authority, 
that such non-traditional activity 
might divest them of immunity. !d. 
at 132, 753 A.2d at 58. The court 
held that Colbert was generally 
protected by statutory immunity. 
Common law immunity confers 
a duty on the police to provide 
protection to the general public, not 
to specific individuals. !d. at 138, 
753 A.2d at 61. This public duty 
doctrine requires that the government 
representative be a public official, that 
the tortious conduct occurred while 
making a discretionary decision in the 
course of performing official duties, 
and that the conduct is without malice. 
!d. at 141,753 A.2d at 62. The law 
in Maryland is well settled, police 
officers performing their duties are 
public officials and as such, fall within 
the purview of qualified immunity as 
to their discretionary acts. !d. (citing 
Clea v. Mayor of Baltimore, 312 
Md. 662,672,541 A.2d 1303, 1308 
(1988)). 
Common law immunity 
encompasses the concept of a 
discretionary function or act. 
Williams, 359 Md. at 140,753 A.2d 
at 62. A discretionary function is ''the 
freedom to act according to ones 
judgment in the absence of a hard and 
fast rule." Id. at 139, 753 A.2d at 
62. Colbert ordinarily had the 
discretion to leave and pick up the 
camera, however, if he told the 
Williarnses that he would remain, then 
he had a duty to tell them he was 
leaving. !d. Accordingly, the court 
held that Colbert was acting within the 
scope of his employment, without 
malice and to the extent that his actions 
were discretionary, he qualified for 
immunity from civil liability. I d. at 
141, 753 A.2d at 62. 
The third and determinative issue 
addressed by the court was whether 
Colbert's affirmative actions and 
specific promises of protection to 
Valerie and Mary Williams created a 
special relationship. Jd. at 144,753 
A.2d at 64. In Ashburn v. Anne 
Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 510 
A.2d 1078 ( 1986), the court of 
appeals held that a special 
relationship existed if a police officer 
affirmatively acted to protect specific 
victims, which resulted in the victim's 
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reliance upon this protection to their 
detriment. Jd. at 150, 753 A.2d at 
68. 
In Ashburn, a police officer 
stopped an intoxicated driver and 
rather than arresting him, ordered 
him to stop driving and park his car 
for the night. !d. After the officer 
left, the driver continued driving and 
hit a pedestrian, John Ashburn. !d. 
The Ashburn court held that a 
special relationship did not exist 
because the officer had not acted 
specifically to Ashburn's benefit. 
!d. 
In the present case, the court 
affirmed Ashburn and held that to 
survive summary judgment, a victim 
must prove that an officer 
affirmatively acted to specifically 
protect her and that she relied on 
that protection to her detriment. !d. 
at 151, 753 A.2d at 68. The court 
found that the facts alleged by 
Williams, if true, were sufficient to 
establish a special relationship. !d. 
If a special relationship existed, 
Colbert had a duty to remain at the 
horne or to inform Williams he was 
going to leave. !d. 
The impact of the William s 
decision is two-fold. First, police 
officers may hesitate to offer 
protection to domestic violence 
victims unless the violence occurred 
in their presence or they are escorting 
the victim to the horne to recover 
personal belongings. In other 
situations, officers will not want to risk 
the potential liability from a victim 
interpreting their actions as affirmative 
actions evoking reliance by the victim. 
Second, the claims of victims who are 
able to allege facts establishing a 
31.1 U. Bait. L.F. 85 
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special relationship will be given 
their day in court rather than barred 
from recovery by common law 
immunity. 
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